

TRAINING FOR SUCCESS: INTELLIGENCE TRAINING IN SUPPORT OF
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS

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Strategic Studies

by

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

TRAINING FOR SUCCESS: INTELLIGENCE TRAINING IN SUPPORT OF HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS, by Major Eric A. Swett, 77 pages.

Since 1 January 2000, the United States (US) military has conducted 50 operations for which it has approved the Humanitarian Service Medal. During these operations intelligence personnel provide critical information such as which areas are affected and in what way, where refugees are gathering, or which areas can be reached by truck and which areas require relief by the limited helicopter assets. While not at the forefront of the capabilities requested during a humanitarian crisis, intelligence assets provide the situational awareness required by planners to coordinate an effective response, especially during early stages. Humanitarian operation reports as far back as 1949 emphasize the difficulties commanders faced due to a lack of intelligence during the initial response to a humanitarian crisis. Fifty-seven years later, the same issue remained unresolved. Does intelligence training prepare intelligence leaders to conduct Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA)? What do common intelligence challenges or successes during recent humanitarian operations indicate about ways in which intelligence training can be improved? These questions, among others, will be explored in order to support or refute the assertion that joint intelligence training should be revised to better support foreign humanitarian assistance?

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ACRONYMS

COP	Common Operating Picture
DCGS-A	Distributed Common Ground Station - Army
DOTMLPF	Doctrine, Organizational, Training, Material, Leadership, Personnel, Facilities
FHA	Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
JIPOE	Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment
JTF	Joint Task Force
NGA	National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
OPLAN	Operations Plan
PIR	Priority Intelligence Requirement
TPFDD	Time Phased Force Deployment Data
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The greatest single difficulty during this (initial) phase of the (humanitarian) operation was gaining accurate intelligence of conditions in the field. Ground communication was very difficult and in many places indeed impossible, due to blocked roads. Although all trunk circuits were in operation by telephone and telegraph, there were many small communities and isolated farms which were cut off from these methods of communication.

— Brigadier General George Stewart, 1949

With a few individual exceptions, the Pentagon's preparations for this cataclysmic storm [Hurricane Katrina] in the days before landfall were slow and unsure. Situational awareness was poor, and the Pentagon was hesitant to move necessary assets unless they were requested. Our military is superb at planning for different threat situations, but it appears that they did not do much . . . to anticipate the challenges of an (humanitarian) incident of national significance.

— United States Senator Joseph Lieberman, 2006

Since 1 January 2000, the United States (US) military has conducted 50 operations for which it has approved the Humanitarian Service Medal. Even this large number is only a partial accounting of the humanitarian assistance operations the U.S. military has conducted in the past 15 years and does not even include such notable operations as Operation United Assistance, which provided support to West African nations during the 2014 - 2015 Ebola crisis, or Operation Sahayogi Haat, which provided humanitarian support to Nepal following the 2015 Nepal earthquake.

In visualizing these humanitarian operations, one mostly conjures up images of doctors conducting surgery in makeshift tent hospitals or military helicopters and trucks delivering food, water and blankets as these are the images presented around the world by new organizations. Unseen are the critical enablers, such as the accountants and logisticians working to rapidly transport millions of dollars of relief supplies into the

affected area, the mechanics which keep the trucks and helicopters running, or the intelligence personnel which provide critical information such as which areas are affected and in what way, where refugees are gathering, or which areas can be reached by truck and which areas require relief by the limited helicopter assets.

While not at the forefront of the capabilities requested during a humanitarian crisis, intelligence assets provide the situational awareness required by planners to coordinate an effective response, especially during early stages. Humanitarian operation reports as far back as 1949 emphasize the difficulties commanders faced due to a lack of intelligence during the initial response to a humanitarian crisis. Fifty-seven years later, the same issue remained unresolved. In a learning organization, which places an emphasis on lessons learned and after action reviews, how were intelligence leaders unprepared or unable to provide situational awareness to decision makers? Does intelligence training prepare intelligence leaders to conduct Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA)? What do common intelligence challenges or successes during recent humanitarian operations indicate about ways in which intelligence training can be improved? These questions, among others, will be explored in this thesis.

Primary Research Question

No one could reasonably argue that the U.S. military of today is the same as that of 2010. Prolonged simultaneous conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan against a resilient and adaptive enemy drove the U.S. military to rapidly adapt our equipment, training, and doctrine. Lessons learned during operations were institutionalized into doctrine within a few years. Intelligence doctrine, which often went 10-15 years between revisions, is currently rarely over two years old. Intelligence training and equipment, both institutional

and field, changed at such a pace that individuals who attended schooling or National Training Center (NTC) rotations a year apart had few similarities in their training.

But did this culture of rapidly incorporating lessons learned spread from combat operations to FHA operations? Was the poor situational awareness during the initial days in 2010 an isolated incident or systemic of a lack of incorporating lessons learned into intelligence FHA training? This will be explored through the primary research question, “Should joint intelligence training be revised to better support foreign humanitarian assistance?”

Secondary Research Questions

In order to answer this question one could review and analyze the intelligence training provided across the military services, various ranks, and intelligence specialties. This study will not do this. This type of approach would provide information on what training is provided, the topics covered, and to whom, but would not address the heart of the matter. The true test of joint intelligence training in support of FHA is in the FHA operations themselves. A case study analysis of successive, recent FHA operations will reveal any common challenges which would indicate that lessons learned are not being integrated and that the training should be revised. Likewise, common successes during the operations may indicate areas in which joint intelligence training in support of FHA is particularly effective and should be retained.

In order to answer the primary research question through case studies, several secondary research questions will be explored. The secondary questions to be answered in this thesis are:

1. What intelligence challenges existed during the recent foreign humanitarian assistance operations United Assistance (Liberia), Tomodachi (Japan), and Unified Response (Haiti)?
2. What intelligence successes existed during the recent foreign humanitarian assistance operations United Assistance (Liberia), Tomodachi (Japan), and Unified Response (Haiti)?
3. Does a case study comparison indicate common challenges which can be remedied during the training of intelligence professionals in order improve their effectiveness in conducting intelligence support to foreign humanitarian operations?
4. Does a case study comparison indicate common successes which can be reinforced during the training of intelligence professionals in order improve their effectiveness in conducting intelligence support to foreign humanitarian operations?

Assumptions

There are a number of assumptions which frame this research on the primary research question, “Should joint intelligence training be revised to better support foreign humanitarian assistance?” These assumptions are believed to be true by the researcher and are necessary to conduct this research. Discussing each one will provide clarity into this research and will set the limits of the validity of this research.

The first assumption of this research is that the selected FHA case studies are representative of FHAs overall. In order to ensure the accuracy of this assumption, the case studies selected, Operation Unified Response in Haiti, Operation Tomodachi in

Japan, and Operation United Assistance in Liberia and Western Africa, were selected for the diversity of issues faced by the responders. The three operations selected are diverse geographically by including operations from three different continents, economically by including both “first world” and “third world” nations, and in the type of assistance required, by including an earthquake recovery operation, a radiological disaster operation, and an infectious disease operation. This diversity strengthens the relevance of the conclusions of this research as they apply to a wide range of FHA operations.

The second assumption of this research is that personnel involved in these operations are representative of the FHA training provided to members of the U.S. military. Once again the diversity of the FHA operations selected for this study supports this assumption. Operations Unified Response and United Assistance consisted of diverse contingents of Army, Air Force, Marine, and Navy personnel from formations throughout the continental based U.S. military. Operation Tomodachi consisted of contingents of Army, Air Force, Marine, and Navy personnel from mostly Japan based U.S. military formations. The units participating in these operations did not specialize in FHA operations but were selected from geographically available forces. The diversity in the forces involved in the selected FHA operations supports the assumption that the personnel involved in these operations are representative of the FHA training provided to all members of the U.S. military.

The third assumption of this research is that there are trainable solutions to the problems encountered during the selected FHA operations. This study is based on answering the primary research question of “Should joint intelligence training be revised to better support foreign humanitarian assistance?” If there are no trainable solutions, be

they on the employment of new technology or doctrine, then a revision of joint intelligence training would result in the same outcomes. In the researcher's experience, almost every solution has a training component and hence this research will recommend trainable solutions to the issues identified in this research.

The fourth and final assumption of this research is that the case studies selected are not just representative of previous FHA operations, but are also predictive of future FHA operations should joint intelligence FHA training remain unchanged. This assumption is bolstered not just by the diversity of the case studies selected, but also by the intentional selection of recent case studies from 2010, 2011, and 2014-2015. The selection of case studies from the last five years, including one from just a year ago, supports the validity of the assumption that issues from these FHA operations are representative of those likely in future FHA operations.

Limitations

The research on this topic is limited to purely unclassified information. While a classified study would allow for additional intelligence related examples in the case study analysis, a review of the classified documents does not reveal any significant impact on the overall analysis and conclusions made within this paper. The limited value of additional specific, detailed intelligence examples is outweighed by the wider readership and greater potential impact of an unclassified research paper.

The researcher may have unintended bias relating to the Operation United Assistance (Liberia) case study due to his service as an intelligence officer in the operation. The potential for bias is mitigated by the three-fold review of this research by the thesis committee. Furthermore, while there is a possibility of bias, the researcher

gained some relevant insight and expertise in FHA operations by participation in Operation United Assistance.

Scope and Delimitations

The scope and delimitations are self-imposed boundaries on the research and analysis of this research. The scope specifies the items which will be included in this research while the delimitations specify items which will not be considered during this study. Clearly defining the scope and delimitations focuses the research in order to provide sufficient depth in answering the primary research question of “Should joint intelligence training be revised to better support foreign humanitarian assistance?”

The scope of this research will be a case study analysis of three recent FHA operations selected for their wide diversity. This research will determine if common intelligence related challenges and/or successes existed during these operations which may indicate joint intelligence training changes which would result in greater operational success in the future.

This research includes several delimitations. The length of this paper and limited resources available for research will not support a detailed direct study of the joint intelligence training leading up to each case study. However, if such research were to be conducted, this would lend additional validity to the results of this research and provide additional insight into the effectiveness of joint intelligence training in supporting FHA. This research will not address FHA operations conducted prior to 2010. This is to ensure the case study analysis results are reflective of recent joint intelligence training conducted under current doctrine and thereby resulting in the most applicable analysis and conclusions relating to current joint intelligence training.

Significance of Study

The significance of this research is in its usefulness in improving the joint intelligence training related to FHA. Improving joint intelligence training for FHA operations will result in several clear benefits. The first benefit is the likely outcome of decreased suffering and loss of life by more effective intelligence provided with less of a learning curve during FHA operations. With better assessments, commanders will receive the information they require to better request, allocate, and distribute resources throughout the affected region. Secondly, the more rapid and efficient response of the U.S. military during FHA operations, especially under the inevitable media spotlight, will generate goodwill towards the US, the U.S. military, and the intelligence community. Finally, this research will serve as a concrete analysis of actual common challenges and successes during recent FHA operations across a widely diverse set of case studies which will support further research into doctrine, organizational, training, material, leadership, personnel, and facility (DOTMLPF) solutions to the challenges and for the reinforcement of the successes.

Furthermore, this research provides a partial answer to one of the Army's Warfighting Challenges. This research provides a partial answer to Army Warfighting Challenge 4: Adapt the Institutional Army. Specifically it partially answers Army Warfighting Challenge 4.1.2 "How does the Army's Generating Force adapt into an innovative organization that efficiently trains, mans, equips, and deploys, in support of making ready an Operating Force tasked with winning in a complex world?" and 4.2.2 "How does the Generating Force adapt situational understanding practices (AWFC #1) and organize an Operational Force capable of engaging and dominating in the

information environment?” By partially answering these questions, this research supports Army leaders in making informed decisions to effectively train intelligence personnel to better support FHA operations.

Summary and Conclusions

One key strength of the U.S. military is its capacity and desire to identify and improve using lessons learned during operations. This research, in answering the question “Should joint intelligence training be revised to better support foreign humanitarian assistance?” will provide analysis and conclusions from three recent, diverse FHA operations to improve joint intelligence training.

The next chapter, chapter 2, will review the existing literature. The review is broken down by each of the three case studies and will discuss each case study from a broad overview of the operation to a detailed review of how it informs on the secondary research questions of:

1. What intelligence challenges existed during the recent foreign humanitarian assistance operations United Assistance (Liberia), Tomodachi (Japan), and Unified Response (Haiti)?
2. What intelligence successes existed during the recent foreign humanitarian assistance operations United Assistance (Liberia), Tomodachi (Japan), and Unified Response (Haiti)?

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Answering the primary research question, “Should joint intelligence training be revised to better support foreign humanitarian assistance?” starts with a review of the current literature. This literature review will cover where this research fits into the current body of knowledge and the relevant existing literature for each of the three case studies, Operation United Assistance (Liberia), Operation Tomodachi (Japan), and Operation Unified Response (Haiti) in order to provide a foundation for answering the primary research question. Additionally, the literature review will answer the secondary research questions:

1. What intelligence challenges existed during the recent foreign humanitarian assistance operations United Assistance (Liberia), Tomodachi (Japan), and Unified Response (Haiti)?
2. What intelligence successes existed during the recent foreign humanitarian assistance operations United Assistance (Liberia), Tomodachi (Japan), and Unified Response (Haiti)?

This chapter is broken down into five areas: (1) Joint Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Doctrine, (2) Operation Unified Response (Haiti), (3) Operation Tomodachi (Japan), (4) Operation United Assistance (Liberia), and (5) Other Literature. Each area will start from a general overview and with each paragraph will zoom in on the aspects of the literature relating to the primary and secondary research questions. Finally, this chapter will summarize the answers to the first and second secondary research questions and explain the additional knowledge which will be added by this research.

Joint Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Doctrine

First, it is critical to understand how the U.S. military defines FHA. According to joint doctrine, as stated in Joint Publication (JP) 3-29, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance*, “FHA consists of Department of Defense (DOD) activities conducted outside the US and its territories to directly relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation” (Department of Defense 2014, 18). JP 3-29 further states “FHA provided by U.S. forces is limited in scope and duration; designed to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation (HN) that has the primary responsibility for providing that assistance; and may support other United States Government (USG) departments or agencies” (Department of Defense 2014, 18). JP 3-29 defines the purpose of FHA as “to save lives, alleviate suffering, and minimize the economic costs of conflict, disasters, and displacement” (Department of Defense 2014, 19).

Next, it is important to understand how the U.S. military describes the role of intelligence in FHA operations. The following quote from JP 3-29 expresses the importance of rapid, early intelligence during FHA operations:

The ability of the U.S. to respond rapidly with appropriate options to potential or actual crises contributes to regional stability. As soon as practical after it is determined that a crisis may develop or a contingency is declared, JFCs and their staffs begin a systematic analysis and determine the intelligence requirements needed to support the anticipated operation and fill the commander’s information gaps. (Department of Defense 2014, I-13)

While the range of intelligence capabilities requested and utilized will vary from operation to operation, joint doctrine specifies certain critical intelligence capabilities for FHA operations. The first capability is the deployment of a NGA team to natural disasters, specifically including earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, and wildfires in order to provide initial damage or recovery mitigation assessments (Department of Defense 2014,

41). Second is the conduct of JIPOE by an intelligence staff in order to give the commander an understanding of the complex political, military, paramilitary, ethnic, religious, economic, medical, environmental, geospatial, criminal, and other aspects of the disaster area (Department of Defense 2014, 70, 94). While the primary intelligence focus should be on answering the commander's PIRs, enough intelligence capability should be requested to broadly collect on all the aspects from the JIPOE (Department of Defense 2014, 94).

There is a large body of existing literature on FHA doctrine and operations. Within this large body of work there is a much smaller subset addressing the intelligence aspects of FHA operations, particularly at the unclassified level. Within this small subset, the work by Danny Bouie in "Humanitarian Assistance and 'Soft' Power Projection" as well as Shannon Huntley's work in "A Study of the United States Intelligence Community's Role in International Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief" were most influential to this research. Bouie's assertion that the military underestimates the strategic effects of FHA operations and the usefulness of FHA operations as a tool to project 'soft' power as part of theater security cooperation plans explains why the military resources and trains 'hard' power operations over a 'soft' power FHA operations (Bouie 2012). Bouie's work lays the groundwork for why the military does little to prepare for FHA operations and how the joint planners can link FHA operations to 'soft' power projection to accomplish regional security goals (Bouie 2012).

Huntley's work further refined the scope to the intelligence community by demonstrating that FHA operations were not only in line with the intelligence community's primary function but that the intelligence community's involvement with

natural disasters furthered U.S. national security interests due to the intertwined nature of disasters, relief efforts, and U.S policy efforts (Huntley 2014).

While Bouie and Huntley present compelling cases for great emphasis to be placed on the involvement of the U.S. military and the intelligence community, respectively, in FHA operations, neither addresses how to do this from a DOTMLPF perspective. The question of what DOTMLPF changes should be made for the military intelligence community to better support FHA operations remains unanswered. This research is focused on answering the T for training in DOTMLPF and thus expand the current body of knowledge from the existing knowledge that the military intelligence community should better support FHA operations to achieve U.S. operational and strategic policy goals to include the specific changes to existing joint intelligence training which should be made, if any, to accomplish this end state.

Operation Unified Response

This is a historic disaster. We have never been confronted with such a disaster in the UN memory. It is like no other. (UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2010)

The 7.0-magnitude earthquake that struck Haiti on January 12, 2010, resulted in unprecedented destruction and disruption in governance. The earthquake destroyed an estimated 100,000 buildings and damaged over 200,000 additional buildings. The earthquake and the resulting destruction killed over 316,000 people and injured 300,000 others. More than one million people were displaced. Leadership in Haiti was severely degraded by the destruction of the presidential palace and 14 of 16 government ministries, the deaths of numerous government officials and employees, the head of mission of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH), and his

principal deputy. In response to a request by the few surviving members of the Haitian Government, President Barack Obama implemented a “whole-of-government” response led by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and supported by the U.S. military. Mobilizing and deploying immediately, the U.S. military established Joint Task Force (JTF)–Haiti (JTF-Haiti) within 48 hours to provide FHA through Operation Unified Response. JTF-Haiti initiated operations on 14 January 2010 and ceased operations on 1 June 2010 following the withdrawal of the U.S. military (Cecchine 2013, 14).

This case study was selected for its representation of a traditional natural disaster FHA operation. This case study is traditional in that it consists of the elements most people would associate with a FHA operation. First, this operation was in response to massive destruction caused by a natural disaster. Second, this operation was in support of a “third world” country which lacked the capacity to respond to the crisis on its own. Third, this operation was focused on providing immediate food, water, shelter, medical, and recovery assistance. This operation encompassed all the typical things that come to mind when hearing FHA; handing out supplies, setting up refugee camps, treating the wounded, and searching for survivors.

Despite this being a “traditional” FHA operation, planners lacked a generic Operations Plan (OPLAN) and associated Time Phased Force Deployment Data (TPFDD) to begin force flow planning (DiOrio 2010, 11). As a result, intelligence capabilities which would have provided an initial assessment of the situation were delayed. The resulting lack of situational awareness “clouded the determination of requirements and priorities, greatly complicating the delivery and distribution of

manpower and supplies” (Joint Center for Operational Analysis 2010, 47). Without this critical intelligence planners simply guessed at what capabilities and capacities were required and deployed them without ever being requested by USAID, the lead agency. As a result, intelligence leaders in Haiti were unsure of what assets they had, where it was, and what else was en route (DiOrio 2010, 11-12).

Despite the initial confusion, intelligence capabilities were deployed and began addressing the critical information gaps. SOUTHCOM’s sole P-3 aircraft was tasked to conduct Full Motion Video (FMV) of Port au Prince within the first 24 hours. A RQ-4 Global Hawk, commercial satellites, and national technical means began collecting geospatial intelligence with 48 hours of the disaster. Five days after the earthquake, Google Earth updated its coverage of Port au Prince. Two weeks after the earthquake detailed analysis of critical infrastructure such as roads, water, and electricity were completed and additional FMV intelligence assets were deployed, including RQ-1 Predators and RC-26 Aircraft. Despite the initial focus on the intelligence technology listed above, much of the required information was ultimately provided by Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Teams arriving later which conducted detailed ground reconnaissance of critical infrastructure and assessments of where to best focus FHA efforts (DiOrio 2010, 13-14).

Many intelligence challenges were identified during Operation Unified Response. The first was a lack of a plan to immediately deploy ground and air intelligence capabilities to provide an early assessment to planners immediately following a disaster (DiOrio 2010, 11-14; Keen 2010, 89; Cecchine 2013, 22). The second intelligence challenge identified was the lack of an existing unclassified system to provide a Common

Operating Picture (COP) for the U.S. military, USAID, State Department, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), foreign militaries, and the Haitian Government entities involved in the disaster response (DiOrio 2010, 14; Pasquale 2013, 16; Keen 2010, 91). Also identified was the need to maintain a JTF capable force trained and ready to deploy in support of FHA operations (Keen 2010, 96; Cecchine 2013, 23). The last challenge identified was the need to conduct training exercises to develop relationships and refine processes prior to an actual FHA operation (Keen 2010, 96; Cecchine 2013, 23).

Several intelligence successes were identified during Operation Unified Response. The first intelligence success was the rapid flexibility in shifting the P-3 Orion and RQ-4 Global Hawk intelligence systems to collect FMV on Port au Prince within the first few days (Joint Center for Operational Analysis 2010, 14). The second was the maximum dissemination of intelligence products at the unclassified level (DiOrio 2010, 13). Third was the rapid augmentation of the intelligence staff with 98 additional personnel within the first 30 days including a General Officer from NORTHCOM (Joint Center for Operational Analysis 2010, 56). Fourth was the ability to leverage commercial imagery sources to provide unclassified overhead imagery of the majority of Haiti every two to three days (Joint Center for Operational Analysis 2010, 60). Lastly, “ISR assets have had a positive impact on decision making by enabling the efficient use of scarce resources . . . in particular, the information provided has assisted in placing only the necessary number of USAID and NGO workers at distribution sites, scheduling the movement of supplies and personnel along the most efficient routes, and when and where to deploy security forces” (Joint Center for Operational Analysis 2010, 61).

Operation Tomodachi

On March 11, 2011, a magnitude 9.0 earthquake struck 80 miles off the eastern coast of Honshu Island, Japan. Less than an hour later, a tsunami with up to 130 foot waves crashed up to six miles inland, affecting over 261 square miles. The earthquake and resulting tsunami killed over 16,000 people, wounded an additional 5,000 people, and over 4,600 people were still unaccounted for over six months after the disaster. Over 14.8 million people were directly affected by the disaster, with a total of 129,500 houses destroyed and 265,324 severely damaged. Compounding the disaster, a series of failures, mechanical and human, at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power complex resulted in widespread radiological contamination (Moroney 2013, 85).

This case study was selected for both its representation of a complex FHA operation and its location in a “first world” nation. Japan, as a “first world” nation, possessed a robust disaster response capability. With one week, Japan had already deployed over 100,000 personnel, 500 aircraft, and 60 ships to the disaster region (Moroney 2013, 120). Despite this robust disaster response capability, Japan was unprepared to respond to the radiological disaster at the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power complex which also complicated the response to the regions affected by the earthquake and tsunami (Wilson 2012, 6). The complex nature of the response is best expressed by the conflict between the disaster response mission of rapidly responding with search and rescue, medical support, and aid, and the radiological response mission of quarantining a 25 nautical mile radius around the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power complex (Wilson 2012, 9).

Initial surveys of airfields and possible forward area refueling points, as well as searches for survivors within the disaster region were conducted by rotary wing aircraft within hours, and by P-3 Orion aircraft within a day of the disaster (Feickert 2011, 7). Later, a RQ-4 Global Hawk was deployed from Guam to assess infrastructure damage within the disaster region using radar and optical capabilities (Feickert 2011, 8). The U.S. military deployed C-12 Huron aircraft, RQ-4 Global Hawk unmanned aerial systems, U-2 surveillance aircraft, and WC-135 Constant Phoenix aircraft, each outfitted with radiation monitoring suites, on March 16, five days after the disaster (Feickert 2011, 5; Wilson 2012, 10, 15). These systems provided a radiological contamination map of the area around the Daiichi nuclear power complex (Feickert 2011, 5).

In addition to the aviation intelligence assets, key ground intelligence enablers were rapidly activated and focused on the disaster response. Imagery and topographical analysts were rapidly engaged to convert the raw intelligence feeds from the aviation assets into maps and graphical products which enabled decision making by key leaders and provided vital information to the disaster response teams (3rd Marine Expeditionary Force 2011, 7). The U.S. military also enlisted the aid of the Google Corporation to utilize Google GPS software paired with GPS enabled vehicles to create a map of passable routes as they were driven (Moroney 2013, 122-123).

Despite the rapid deployment of intelligence collection assets and supporting ground analysts, several challenges hindered the effectiveness of the U.S. military response. The most critical challenge was the lack of a single COP and information sharing platform (Pasquale 2013, 25). Several different platforms were created and caused confusion during the response (Pasquale 2013, 25). Of particular note, the lack of

a single COP created a situation in which separate COPs showed the locations of personnel, the status of infrastructure, and the radiological contaminated areas (Stephenson 2014, 6).

Communications between different branches of the U.S. military were hampered by different, incompatible chat tools, such as mIRC and Jabber which are not programmed to exchange messages, degrading the dissemination of actionable intelligence (Pasquale 2013, 25). The limitation of only two P-3 Orion aircraft resulted in a delay of several days until the aircraft were able to collect on the lines of communication due to high priority collection requirements. This collection gap was mitigated through the use of Google GPS software and GPS enabled vehicles to drive and thus map the passable roads (Moroney 2013, 123).

The speed of the initial response and ability to rapidly provide critical information on the status of infrastructure, lines of communication, and survivors by intelligence assets led to the overwhelming success of Operation Tomodachi (Kaczur 2012, 47). The rapid response within the first few hours by the rotary wing and within a day by P-3 Orion aircraft, and the FHA operation expertise of the key leaders on these aircraft provided the intelligence senior leaders required to determine which airfield(s) could quickly be restored for incoming humanitarian and relief supplies (18th Wing History Office 2012, 6). A rotary wing aircraft containing an intelligence Soldier who spoke fluent Japanese identified a building with 200 survivors and lowered down the intelligence Soldier to determine the current situation and status of supplies of the survivors (18th Wing History Office 2012, 7). This enabled commanders to dispatch the proper supplies and medical capabilities to the survivors. The P-3 Orion aircraft also

conducted reconnaissance of lines of communication which enabled both Japanese and US response teams to reach and resupply isolated personnel. The P-3 aircraft then conducted Full Motion Video (FMV) surveys of the ports and coastline of the disaster region in order to locate suitable embarkation sites. The FMV feed was transmitted live to the USS Essex, an amphibious assault ship, for future landing craft operations (18th Wing History Office 2012, 11).

U.S. military leaders during Operation Tomodachi stressed from the outset the importance of gaining situational awareness early (Reid 2011, 13). These leaders further stated the importance of drafting a collection plan early in the planning process (Reid 2011, 18). This collection plan led to the early deployment of imagery and topographical analysts which were able to turn the FMV and radar information from the surveillance aircraft into usable products for both the decision makers and the response teams (3rd Marine Expeditionary Force 2011, 7). The collection emphasis also led to the use of intelligence aviation assets, outfitted with radiation monitoring suites, to accurately map the radiological contaminant dispersal from the Daichii nuclear power complex (Wilson 2012, 10). The radiological information obtained showed significant deviation from the computer-aided models which were being used (Wilson 2012, 10; Feikert 2011, 5).

Operation United Assistance

Starting in December 2013, the Ebola virus spread throughout the Western African nations of Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone. By the late summer of 2014, the Ebola virus had killed thousands and was threatening to spread further. In September 2014, the US President directed the U.S. military to establish a JTF to execute the FHA Operation United Assistance. The U.S. Army Africa (USARAF) under the U.S. Africa

Command (USAFRICOM), deployed from Italy to Liberia to conduct the initial planning for the Ebola crisis response. In October 2014, after two months in Liberia, USARAF transitioned command of the JTF to the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault). The JTF constructed Ebola treatment centers, deployed mobile lab to remote areas for rapid Ebola testing, and provided the logistical backbone for the Ebola response efforts. By late 2015, the efforts of Operation United Assistance led to the eradication of Ebola from Liberia (Williams 2015, 76).

This case study was selected for its focus as a disease response effort rather than a more traditional disaster relief response. Given this case study's focus on disease response, results of this research which apply to all three case studies have greater validity as universal results applicable to a wide range of FHA operations. The medical capabilities of Liberia, as a "third world" nation were quickly overwhelmed by the virus and shortages of basic protective equipment such as tyvex suits or latex gloves led to the infection and loss of many medical staff members. The specialized medical capabilities required for this mission, the ineffectiveness of traditional intelligence capabilities to collect on a medical threat, and the severe risk of each and every interaction with another person make this case study a valuable addition to the overall diversity of the case studies selected (Williams 2015, 78).

The different nature of a disease FHA response effort required a similarly different intelligence response. Traditional intelligence collection platforms, such as the RQ-4 Global Hawk, would be of little value as infrastructure was undamaged and there were no refugees to locate. Instead only a small cell of intelligence personnel were deployed starting 96 hours after the operation was declared, mostly consisting of analysts,

geospatial intelligence, and counterintelligence personnel (Center for Army Lessons Learned 2015, 43). Most intelligence processing was conducted by intelligence personnel remaining at home station (Center for Army Lessons Learned 2015, 43; U.S. Army Africa 2015, 46-48). While counterintelligence personnel focused primarily on force protection, the analysts and geospatial intelligence personnel received most of their information from open source reporting and liaisons. The analysts used the information to track the spread of Ebola, the effectiveness of various strategies to defeat Ebola, and used predictive analysis to inform the JTF commander where resources could be most effectively applied (Center for Army Lessons Learned 2015, 41). The geospatial intelligence personnel developed maps and graphical representations of the disease which were used by the JTF, the Liberian Government, and various NGOs to combat the disease. In order to effectively display and disseminate the intelligence the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) coordinated with the Distributed Common Ground System - Army (DCGS-A) Program Manager (PM) to develop an unclassified version of the system to use as the COP (Edwards 2015, 1). In addition to the unique unclassified DCGS-A capability, the U.S. military utilized the National Center for Medical Intelligence (NCMI) to provide epidemiology intelligence in order to mitigate the Ebola threat to the JTF while enabling an effective response (The XX Committee 2014, 1; U.S. Army Africa 2015, 47-48).

Many intelligence challenges were identified during Operation United Assistance. First, the JTF did not have an existing effective COP platform at the unclassified level (Edwards 2015, 1). Second, the NMCI is staffed and organized to provide senior military and civilian decision makers with specialized intelligence to understand and mitigate

medical threats; they are not staffed and organized to provide support to JTF and subordinate commands (The XX Committee 2014, 1; U.S. Army Africa 2015, 47-48). The JTF intelligence analysts modified existing intelligence techniques to provide accurate current situational awareness and a well assessed predictive analysis of the Ebola disease (Center for Army Lessons Learned 2015, 42). Third, split-based operations, with intelligence personnel in Liberia and at home station collaborating to produce products, created synchronization and information sharing challenges (Center for Army Lessons Learned 2015, 43; U.S. Army Africa 2015, 46-48). Fourth, the initial lack of standardized briefing formats for the commander resulted in limited intelligence personnel spending significant amounts of time reformatting data rather than collecting and analyzing information (Center for Army Lessons Learned 2015, 43).

The challenges provided the opportunity for several successes during Operation United Assistance. First, the lack of an existing unclassified COP platform led the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) to coordinate with the DCGS-A PM to develop an unclassified DCGS-A system to serve as the COP. The resulting unclassified DCGS-A system served not only as the COP but also retained key software tools which enable intelligence personnel to pull and analyze information at the unclassified level (Edwards 2015, 1). The second success was the information and procedures provided by the NMCI which enabled the JTF personnel to action the Ebola disease crisis with minimal limitations and protective equipment requirements (The XX Committee 2014, 1). This medical intelligence led to the safe execution of the mission with no U.S. military members contracting Ebola. Third, the use of split-based intelligence reduced the strain on limited life support in Liberia, as well as reduced the risk to U.S. military members

from Ebola, while retaining a significant intelligence analysis and production capability (Center for Army Lessons Learned 2015, 43).

Summary and Conclusions

The three case studies selected provide for a broad range of FHA operations. The case studies range from disaster relief, to disaster relief and radiological contamination, to a medically focused disease response. The case studies include both “first world” and “third world” nations and span three continents. The intelligence responses and capabilities employed are equally diverse. The wide diversity in many areas of these case studies strengthens resulting conclusions from this research and its applicability to a wide variety of FHA operations.

Several intelligence challenges and successes were identified during the literature review for each FHA operation. Several common challenges were identified including the lack of an existing universal COP platform for FHA operations and the length of time to deploy intelligence assets to the regions. Several common successes were also identified including the critical capability geospatial intelligence Soldiers provide as well as the positive impact on resource allocation derived from enhanced situational awareness from intelligence products.

While the literature provides a narrative of the intelligence challenges and successes during FHA operations, research has not been conducted on the effectiveness of current joint intelligence training in supporting FHA operations. This research will analyze the challenges and successes to answer the primary research question, “Should joint intelligence training be revised to better support foreign humanitarian assistance?” Furthermore, should the answer be that joint intelligence training should be revised to

better support FHA, the analysis will indicate revisions which are applicable across a diverse range of FHA operations and not those of just a single operation.

The next chapter, chapter 3, will discuss the research methodology. chapter 3 will inform on the steps taken to obtain the information presented in this chapter, the methodology for analyzing the case studies, and the criteria for determining the answer to the primary and secondary research questions.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

To answer the primary research question, “Should joint intelligence training be revised to better support foreign humanitarian assistance?” a quantitative and qualitative case study analysis methodology will be utilized. This chapter will discuss the rationale behind the methodology selected, a step by step review of the methodology utilized, the screening and evaluation criteria which will be used in chapter 4, and the advantages and disadvantages to the selected methodology.

A case study analysis methodology was selected due to its ability to provide an answer to the primary research question grounded in the practical application of FHA. While a review of the current FHA related intelligence curriculum at military schools or a review of current military FHA related intelligence training would appear to better answer the research question, it would in fact fail to do so. It would actually merely provide an answer to the effectiveness of FHA related intelligence training as compared to academic or training standards. The true measure of the effectiveness of any training is its application in real world situations.

A good analogy of the point would be the study of math. One could determine if math education required revision by looking at the training of math. Quantitative and qualitative metrics such as the number of classroom hours, the test scores of students, or the teaching methodology used could be analyzed. However none of these results would be as valuable as an analysis of the ability of the students to properly use math in real life applications such as making change, balancing a budget, or determining the amount of wood to purchase to build a fence. Even if a study of math education determined no

revision was required, if a study of the real life application by the same students found that a majority struggled to determine the change from a purchase, then the education of math should be revised.

This same reasoning is the rationale behind conducting a case study analysis of three FHA operations, Operation Unified Response (Haiti), Operation Tomodachi (Japan), and Operation United Assistance (Liberia), in order to determine the answer to the primary research question, “Should joint intelligence training be revised to better support foreign humanitarian assistance?” Intelligence challenges or successes during these operations can be analyzed to determine if joint intelligence training should be revised.

These operations were each selected with care to provide the best possible conclusions and widest applicability of this research through the selection of widely diverse case studies. The first selection criteria was a limitation to FHA operations between 2010 and 2015. This limitation ensured the results of the case study analysis were applicable to current joint intelligence training. The second selection criteria was geographical dispersion. This ensured the results would have the widest application across the globe and were not based on local geographical or political factors. The third selection criteria was economic status. Both “first world” and “third world” case studies were selected in order to maximize the economic diversity in the case studies. The fourth and final selection criteria was the type of FHA crisis. The case studies selected range from widespread physical destruction, to radiological contamination, to a disease pandemic.

Methodology Steps

This research uses a five step methodology to determine the answer to the primary research question, “Should joint intelligence training be revised to better support foreign humanitarian assistance?” and the secondary research questions. This systematic quantitative and qualitative approach leads to not just a yes or no answer, but to the degrees of revision required, in what areas, and by whom. This provides a deeper understanding of the issue and an in-depth analysis of each finding. The steps are as follows:

Step 1 (Literature Review): Select three case studies meeting the four criteria listed above and conduct a literature review of each. Furthermore, conduct a wider literature review on FHA operations training, intelligence support to FHA operations, and DoD FHA doctrine.

Step 2 (Analysis): Analyze case studies to answer the secondary research questions of:

1. What intelligence challenges existed during the recent foreign humanitarian assistance operations United Assistance (Liberia), Tomodachi (Japan), and Unified Response (Haiti)?
2. What intelligence successes existed during the recent foreign humanitarian assistance operations United Assistance (Liberia), Tomodachi (Japan), and Unified Response (Haiti)?

Step 3 (Develop Criteria): Determine valid screening and evaluation criteria for the intelligence challenges and successes identified during operations United Assistance (Liberia), Tomodachi (Japan), and Unified Response (Haiti).

Step 4 (Criteria Application): Apply the screening and evaluation criteria to the intelligence challenges and successes identified during operations United Assistance (Liberia), Tomodachi (Japan), and Unified Response (Haiti) and present the findings.

Step 5 (Conclusions): Draw conclusions to the primary and secondary research questions and make recommendations for future research.

Screening and Evaluation Criteria

This research uses a qualitative screening criteria to exclude intelligence challenges and successes which do not result from joint intelligence training in whole or in part. These intelligence challenges and successes cannot be addressed through training and therefore are beyond the scope of this research and are thus screened out. The evaluation criteria for the remaining intelligence challenges and successes are a mix of four quantitative and qualitative criteria which determine the universality, importance, training applicability, and responsibility for each challenge or success.

The screening criteria is “Can the intelligence challenge or success be addressed, in whole or in part, through training?” The screening criteria will be presented using the format in table 1. Affirmative answers continue to the evaluation criteria, negative answers are screened out as they are beyond the scope of this research.

Table 1. Screening Criteria

Intelligence Challenges and Successes	Can be Addressed Through Training	Cannot be Addressed Through Training
1.		
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		

Source: Developed by author.

The first evaluation criteria is the universality of the intelligence challenges or successes to the three case studies. The occurrence or non-occurrence of each intelligence challenge or success during each operation will be noted as a “yes” or “no.” This quantitative evaluation will be presented as depicted in table 2.

Table 2. Universality Evaluation Criteria

Intelligence Challenges and Successes	Operation Unified Response	Operation Tomodachi	Operation United Assistance
1.			
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			

Source: Developed by author.

The second evaluation criteria is the importance of each intelligence challenge or success. This qualitative analysis will be based on the literature review for each operation in which the challenge or success occurred and the relative importance to the overall

operation as indicated in the available literature. This evaluation will be presented as depicted in table 3.

Table 3. Importance Evaluation Criteria

Intelligence Challenges and Successes	High Importance	Medium Importance	Low Importance
1.			
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			

Source: Developed by author.

The third evaluation criteria is the training applicability of each intelligence challenge or success. Not all intelligence challenges or successes can be addressed through training alone. Many require a combination of DOTMLPF solutions to be fully addressed. This qualitative analysis will determine if the intelligence challenge or success can be addressed by training completely, moderately (50 percent or greater), or minimally (less than 50 percent). The results of this analysis will be presented as depicted in table 4.

Table 4. Training Applicability Evaluation Criteria

Intelligence Challenges and Successes	Completely Addressed	Moderately Addressed	Minimally Addressed
1.			
2.			
3.			
4.			
5.			

Source: Developed by author.

The fourth and final evaluation criteria is the responsibility of each intelligence challenge or success. This qualitative criteria will assess the ability of institutional or unit training to address each intelligence challenge or success. For purposes of this research, live exercises and training center rotations are considered unit training. The results of this analysis will be presented as depicted in table 5.

Table 5. Responsibility Evaluation Criteria

Intelligence Challenges and Successes	Institutional Training	Unit Training
1.		
2.		
3.		
4.		
5.		

Source: Developed by author.

Advantages and Disadvantages

There are several advantages to the methodology used in this research. The first advantage is the greater universal applicability of its conclusions and recommendations due to the diversity of case studies utilized. The second advantage is the quality of the results provided by the evaluation criteria and associated analysis, as the methodology provides far more than a yes or no response by analyzing any recommended revision to determine how much revision is required, how important it is, and how much training revision alone can be expected to affect the issue and who should be responsible for the revision. Finally, an advantage is the real world practical applicability of this research based on real world, recent examples.

There are some disadvantages to the methodology used in this research. The first disadvantage is the limited number of case studies used due to the length restrictions of this research paper. Smaller sample sizes carry greater risk of producing inaccurate results because it may not truly represent the larger group. The second disadvantage is subjective nature of qualitative analysis. While the researcher attempted to remove bias and present each data point objectively, each person will analyze the same data slightly differently based on a variety of factors. The third and final disadvantage to the methodology selected for this research is the inferred training causality for each intelligence success or failure.

Chapter Summary

This chapter discussed the utilization of quantitative and qualitative case study analysis methodology to answer the primary research question, “Should joint intelligence training be revised to better support foreign humanitarian assistance?” This chapter

further discussed the rationale behind the methodology selected, a step by step review of the methodology utilized, the screening and evaluation criteria which will be used in chapter 4, and the advantages and disadvantages of the selected methodology.

The next chapter, chapter 4, will discuss the analysis of the case studies. chapter 4 will apply the screening and evaluation criteria presented in this chapter, discuss the analysis and literature support for each determination, and answer the primary and secondary research questions.

CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

Introduction

Chapter 4 will present the results of the analysis of the research data in order to answer the primary research question of “Should joint intelligence training be revised to better support foreign humanitarian assistance?” This chapter will screen and evaluate the commonalities, differences, patterns and relationships across the three selected case studies of Operation Unified Response, Operation Tomodachi, and Operation United Assistance. The analysis of the results from each of the screening and evaluation criteria will answer the primary research question and four secondary research questions and lead to the results and conclusions presented in chapter 5.

Purpose

Foreign humanitarian assistance is a vital aspect of the United States’ security strategy. By quickly restoring essential services and governance following a man-made or natural disaster, FHA reduces instability and reinforces security cooperation throughout the world. In many cases FHA is the prevention in the old adage “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.” By responding quickly and effectively the United States not only improves stability and security, but also enhances its prestige and goodwill throughout the region, resulting in many tangible and intangible benefits. The converse is also true; if the United States slowly and ineffectively conducts FHA operations, instability is increased, security is reduced, and the prestige and influence of the United States in the region is reduced. This research addresses the training aspect of FHA and

will answer the primary research question of “Should joint intelligence training be revised to better support foreign humanitarian assistance?”

The significance of this research is in its usefulness in improving the joint intelligence training related to FHA. This will result in several clear benefits. The first benefit is the likely result of decreased suffering and loss of life by more effective intelligence provided with less of a learning curve during FHA operations. With improved situational understanding, commanders will be able to better request, allocate, and distribute resources throughout the affected region. Secondly, the more rapid and efficient response of the U.S. military during FHA operations, especially under the inevitable media spotlight, will generate goodwill towards the US, the U.S. military, and the intelligence community. Finally, this research will serve as a concrete analysis of actual common challenges and successes during recent FHA operations across a widely diverse set of case studies which will support further research into doctrine, organizational, training, material, leadership, personnel, and facility (DOTMLPF) solutions to the challenges and for the reinforcement of the successes.

Furthermore, this research provides a partial answer to one of the Army’s Warfighting Challenges. This research provides a partial answer to Army Warfighting Challenge 4: Adapt the Institutional Army. Specifically it partially answers Army Warfighting Challenge 4.1.2 “How does the Army’s Generating Force adapt into an innovative organization that efficiently trains, mans, equips, and deploys, in support of making ready an Operating Force tasked with winning in a complex world?” and 4.2.2” How does the Generating Force adapt situational understanding practices (AWFC #1) and organize an Operational Force capable of engaging and dominating in the

information environment?” By partially answering these questions, this research supports Army leaders in making informed decisions to effectively train intelligence personnel to better support FHA operations.

Process

The analysis in this chapter follows the research methodology described in chapter 3. This chapter, as step 4 of the research methodology, applies the screening criteria and the four evaluation criteria to the research data from chapter 2. The results of the screening and evaluation criteria will be analyzed using a mix of quantitative and qualitative analysis, however, the foundation remains qualitative data.

The analysis will consist of a four step process. The first step will be an analysis of the selected case studies in order to answer the first and second secondary research questions. The second step will be the application of the screening criteria and analysis of the results. The third step will answer the third and fourth secondary research questions through the application and analysis of the evaluation criteria of universality, importance, ability to be addressed through training, and whether the responsibility for the training rests with institutional or unit training. The fourth step will answer the primary research question.

This chapter will end with a summary of the key results of the analysis and lead into the resulting conclusions and recommendations which will be presented in chapter 5.

Analysis

The secondary research questions must be answered in order to fully answer the primary research question of should joint intelligence training be revised to better support

foreign humanitarian assistance. The first two secondary research questions will be answered through the analysis

Intelligence Challenges and Successes

This section will use the research literature in order to answer the first and second secondary research questions consisting of:

1. What intelligence challenges existed during the recent foreign humanitarian assistance operations United Assistance (Liberia), Tomodachi (Japan), and Unified Response (Haiti)?
2. What intelligence successes existed during the recent foreign humanitarian assistance operations United Assistance (Liberia), Tomodachi (Japan), and Unified Response (Haiti)?

This section is organized into three sections, one for each case study. Each section will identify the intelligence challenges and successes during the respective FHA operation and thus answer the first and second secondary research questions. The resulting intelligence challenges and successes of all three case studies will be used for the qualitative screening and evaluation criteria of the next section.

Operation Unified Response (Haiti)

Many intelligence challenges were identified during Operation Unified Response. The first was a lack of a plan to immediately deploy ground and air intelligence capabilities to provide an early assessment to planners immediately following a disaster (DiOrio 2010, 11-14; Keen 2010, 89; Cecchine 2013, 22). The second intelligence challenge identified was the lack of an existing unclassified system to provide a Common

Operating Picture (COP) for the U.S. military, USAID, State Department, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), foreign militaries, and the Haitian Government entities involved in the disaster response (DiOrio 2010, 14; Pasquale 2013, 16; Keen 2010, 91). Also identified was the need to maintain a JTF capable force trained and ready to deploy in support of FHA operations (Keen 2010, 96; Cecchine 2013, 23). The last challenge identified was the need to conduct training exercises to develop relationships and refine processes prior to an actual FHA operation (Keen 2010, 96; Cecchine 2013, 23).

Several intelligence successes were identified during Operation Unified Response. The first intelligence success was the rapid flexibility in shifting the P-3 Orion and RQ-4 Global Hawk intelligence systems to collect FMV on Port au Prince within the first few days (Joint Center for Operational Analysis 2010, 14). The second was the maximum dissemination of intelligence products at the unclassified level (DiOrio 2010, 13). Third was the rapid augmentation of the intelligence staff with 98 additional personnel within the first 30 days including a General Officer from NORTHCOM (Joint Center for Operational Analysis 2010, 56). Fourth was the ability to leverage commercial imagery sources to provide unclassified overhead imagery of the majority of Haiti every two to three days (Joint Center for Operational Analysis 2010, 60). Lastly, “ISR assets have had a positive impact on decision making by enabling the efficient use of scarce resources . . . in particular, the information provided has assisted in placing only the necessary number of USAID and NGO workers at distribution sites, scheduling the movement of supplies and personnel along the most efficient routes, and when and where to deploy security forces” (Joint Center for Operational Analysis 2010, 61).

Operation Tomodachi (Japan)

Initial surveys of airfields and possible forward area refueling points, as well as searches for survivors within the disaster region were conducted by rotary wing aircraft within hours, and by P-3 Orion aircraft within a day of the disaster (Feickert 2011, 7). Later, a RQ-4 Global Hawk was deployed from Guam to assess infrastructure damage within the disaster region using radar and optical capabilities (Feickert 2011, 8). The U.S. military deployed C-12 Huron aircraft, RQ-4 Global Hawk unmanned aerial systems, U-2 surveillance aircraft, and WC-135 Constant Phoenix aircraft, each outfitted with radiation monitoring suites, on March 16, five days after the disaster (Feickert 2011, 5; Wilson 2012, 10,15). These systems provided a radiological contamination map of the area around the Daiichi nuclear power complex (Feickert 2011, 5).

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Despite the rapid deployment of intelligence collection assets and supporting ground analysts, several challenges hindered the effectiveness of the U.S. military response. The most critical challenge was the lack of a single COP and information sharing platform (Pasquale 2013, 25). Several different platforms were created and

caused confusion during the response (Pasquale 2013, 25). Of particular note, the lack of a single COP created a situation in which separate COPs showed the locations of personnel, the status of infrastructure, and the radiological contaminated areas (Stephenson 2014, 6).

Communications between different branches of the U.S. military were hampered by different, incompatible chat tools, such as mIRC and Jabber which are not programmed to exchange messages, degrading the dissemination of actionable intelligence (Pasquale 2013, 25). The limitation of only two P-3 Orion aircraft resulted in a delay of several days until the aircraft were able to collect on the lines of communication due to high priority collection requirements. This collection gap was mitigated through the use of Google GPS software and GPS enabled vehicles to drive and thus map the passable roads (Moroney 2013, 123).

The speed of the initial response and ability to rapidly provide critical information on the status of infrastructure, lines of communication, and survivors by intelligence assets led to the overwhelming success of Operation Tomodachi (Kaczur 2012, 47). The rapid response within the first few hours by the rotary wing and within a day by P-3 Orion aircraft, and the FHA operation expertise of the key leaders on these aircraft provided the intelligence senior leaders required to determine which airfield(s) could quickly be restored for incoming humanitarian and relief supplies (18th Wing History Office 2012, 6). A rotary wing aircraft containing an intelligence Soldier who spoke fluent Japanese identified a building with 200 survivors and lowered down the intelligence Soldier to determine the current situation and status of supplies of the survivors (18th Wing History Office 2012, 7). This enabled commanders to dispatch the

proper supplies and medical capabilities to the survivors. The P-3 Orion aircraft also conducted reconnaissance of lines of communication which enabled both Japanese and US response teams to reach and resupply isolated personnel. The P-3 aircraft then conducted Full Motion Video (FMV) surveys of the ports and coastline of the disaster region in order to locate suitable embarkation sites. The FMV feed was transmitted live to the USS Essex, an amphibious assault ship, for future landing craft operations (18th Wing History Office 2012, 11).

U.S. military leaders during Operation Tomodachi stressed from the outset the importance of gaining situational awareness early (Reid 2011, 13). These leaders further stated the importance of drafting a collection plan early in the planning process (Reid 2011, 18). This collection plan led to the early deployment of imagery and topographical analysts which were able to turn the FMV and radar information from the surveillance aircraft into usable products for both the decision makers and the response teams (3rd Marine Expeditionary Force 2011, 7). The collection emphasis also led to the use of intelligence aviation assets, outfitted with radiation monitoring suites, to accurately map the radiological contaminant dispersal from the Daichii nuclear power complex (Wilson 2012, 10). The radiological information obtained showed significant deviation from the computer-aided models which were being used (Wilson 2012, 10; Feikert 2011, 5).

Operation United Assistance (Liberia)

Many intelligence challenges were identified during Operation United Assistance. First, the JTF did not have an existing effective COP platform at the unclassified level (Edwards 2015, 1). Second, the NMCI is staffed and organized to provide senior military and civilian decision makers with specialized intelligence to understand and mitigate

medical threats; they are not staffed and organized to provide support to JTF and subordinate commands (The XX Committee 2014, 1; U.S. Army Africa 2015, 47-48). The JTF intelligence analysts modified existing intelligence techniques to provide accurate current situational awareness and a well assessed predictive analysis of the Ebola disease (Center for Army Lessons Learned 2015, 42). Third, split-based operations, with intelligence personnel in Liberia and at home station collaborating to produce products, created synchronization and information sharing challenges (Center for Army Lessons Learned 2015, 43; U.S. Army Africa 2015, 46-48). Fourth, the initial lack of standardized briefing formats for the commander resulted in limited intelligence personnel spending significant amounts of time reformatting data rather than collecting and analyzing information (Center for Army Lessons Learned 2015, 43).

The challenges provided the opportunity for several successes during Operation United Assistance. First, the lack of an existing unclassified COP platform led the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) to coordinate with the DCGS-A PM to develop an unclassified DCGS-A system to serve as the COP. The resulting unclassified DCGS-A system served not only as the COP but also retained key software tools which enable intelligence personnel to pull and analyze information at the unclassified level (Edwards 2015, 1). The second success was the information and procedures provided by the NMCI which enabled the JTF personnel to action the Ebola disease crisis with minimal limitations and protective equipment requirements (The XX Committee 2014, 1; U.S. Army Africa 2015, 47-48). This medical intelligence led to the safe execution of the mission with no U.S. military members contracting Ebola. Third, the use of split-based intelligence reduced the strain on limited life support in Liberia, as well as reduced the

risk to U.S. military members from Ebola, while retaining a significant intelligence analysis and production capability (Center for Army Lessons Learned 2015, 43; U.S. Army Africa 2015, 46-48).

Screening Criteria

The screening criteria for this research is the question: “Can the intelligence challenge or success be addressed, in whole or in part, through training?” The purpose of the screening criteria is to identify and remove intelligence challenges or successes from the selected FHA case studies which cannot be addressed, at least in part, through training. The screening results are presented in table 6. Affirmative answers continue to the evaluation criteria, negative answers are screened out as they are beyond the scope of this research.

Table 6. Screening Criteria

Intelligence Challenges and Successes	Can be Addressed Through Training	Cannot be Addressed Through Training
1. Inadequate intelligence capabilities during first 72 hours	X	
2. Lack of an existing unclassified COP system	X	
3. No prior FHA training for JTF	X	
4. Incompatible intelligence and chat systems		X
5. Modifying existing intelligence techniques to FHA operations	X	
6. Difficulty of split based operations	X	
7. Successful shifting of intelligence collection assets within the first five days	X	
8. Maximum dissemination of unclassified products	X	
9. Rapid deployment of intelligence personnel	X	
10. Effective use of commercial satellites for unclassified imagery	X	
11. Developing situational understanding	X	
12. Use of unclassified Distributed Common Ground Station (DCGS)	X	

Source: Developed by author.

The results of the screening criteria show that 11 of the 12 intelligence challenges and successes can be addressed, at least in part, through training. One of the intelligence challenges, incompatible intelligence and chat systems cannot be addressed through

training as it is a software compatibility issue and must instead be addressed through the material solution portion of the DOTMLPF framework. The remaining 11 intelligence challenges and successes range from a training only solution, as in the case of no FHA training for JTF, to a mix of DOTMLPF elements including training, as in the case of incompatible intelligence and chat systems which most likely requires a material software component to the solution in order to be successful.

The results of the screening criteria with 11 of 12 identified intelligence challenges and successes during the three FHA operations indicates, but does not singularly establish an affirmative answer to the primary research question of should joint intelligence training be revised to better support foreign humanitarian assistance. The third and fourth secondary research questions must be answered through the use of the following evaluation criteria in order to establish this indication.

Evaluation Criteria

The universality evaluation criteria will establish the degree to which the 11 remaining identified intelligence challenges and successes are likely to apply to a broad range of FHA operations given the diversity of sample FHA operations chosen for this research and will directly answer the third and fourth secondary research questions of:

3. Does a case study comparison indicate common challenges which can be remedied during the training of intelligence professionals in order improve their effectiveness in conducting intelligence support to foreign humanitarian operations?
4. Does a case study comparison indicate common successes which can be reinforced during the training of intelligence professionals in order improve

their effectiveness in conducting intelligence support to foreign humanitarian operations?

Table 7. Universality Evaluation Criteria

Intelligence Challenges and Successes	Operation Unified Response	Operation Tomodachi	Operation United Assistance
1. Inadequate intelligence capabilities during first 72 hours	YES	YES	NO
2. Lack of an existing unclassified COP system	YES	YES	YES
3. No prior FHA training for JTF	YES	NO	YES
4. Modifying existing intelligence techniques to FHA operations	NO	YES	YES
5. Difficulty of split based operations	NO	NO	YES
6. Successful shifting of intelligence collection assets within the first five days	YES	YES	NO
7. Maximum dissemination of unclassified products	YES	YES	NO
8. Rapid deployment of intelligence personnel	YES	YES	NO
9. Effective use of commercial satellites for unclassified imagery	YES	YES	NO
10. Developing situational understanding	YES	YES	YES
11. Use of unclassified Distributed Common Ground Station (DCGS)	NO	NO	YES

Source: Developed by author.

As depicted in table 7, the application of the universality evaluation criteria to the remaining intelligence challenges and successes shows two intelligence challenges and successes which were present during all three selected FHA operations. Seven of the intelligence challenges and successes were present in two of the three selected FHA operations. Two of the intelligence challenges and successes were only present during one of the three selected FHA operations.

The success of intelligence in developing situational understanding was universal to all three operations. Likewise the intelligence challenge of a lack of an existing unclassified COP system in order to disseminate the situational understanding was common to all three operations. Of interest, the intelligence success of using an unclassified DCGS system as the COP, while only used in one of the selected FHA operations and not scoring high on the universality evaluation criteria, is a universal solution to the common challenge of the lack of an existing unclassified COP. While as of this research the difficulty of split based operations only existed during one of the selected FHA operations and thus indicates low universality, should split based operations become commonplace this areas should be relooked for inclusion into joint intelligence training for FHA operations.

With the universality of each intelligence challenge and success established, the importance evaluation criteria will establish the importance of each intelligence challenge and success as indicated in the research from chapter 2.

Table 8. Importance Evaluation Criteria

Intelligence Challenges and Successes	High Importance	Medium Importance	Low Importance
1. Inadequate intelligence capabilities during first 72 hours	X		
2. Lack of an existing unclassified COP system	X		
3. No prior FHA training for JTF		X	
4. Modifying existing intelligence techniques to FHA operations			X
5. Difficulty of split based operations			X
6. Successful shifting of intelligence collection assets within the first five days		X	
7. Maximum dissemination of unclassified products	X		
8. Rapid deployment of intelligence personnel		X	
9. Effective use of commercial satellites for unclassified imagery			X
10. Developing situational understanding	X		
11. Use of unclassified Distributed Common Ground Station (DCGS)		X	

Source: Developed by author.

In the literature reviewed in chapter 2 the most common intelligence challenges and successes written about and specifically mentioned in quotes by the senior leaders included the importance of intelligence in developing situational understanding, the

limited intelligence capabilities during the first and most critical 72 hours, the lack of an existing single unclassified COP system, and the importance of producing unclassified products in order to maximize distribution. Four additional intelligence challenges and successes obtained an evaluation of medium importance while three intelligence challenges and successes obtained an evaluation of low importance due to limited mention, lack of emphasis, or other factors in the source material.

The application of the importance evaluation criteria establishes the high importance of both of the two intelligence challenges and successes previously identified as universal to all three selected FHA operations; developing situational understanding and the lack of an existing unclassified COP system. Two of the seven intelligence challenges and successes identified as common to two of the three selected FHA operations. the limited intelligence capability during the first 72 hours and the maximum dissemination of unclassified products, were evaluated to be of higher importance than the remaining five. Two of the seven intelligence challenges and successes identified as common to two of the three selected FHA operations. modifying existing intelligence techniques to FHA operations and effective use of commercial satellites for unclassified imagery, were evaluated to be of low importance. The results of the importance evaluation criteria when combined with the results of the universality evaluation criteria not only strongly suggest that joint intelligence training should be revised to better support foreign humanitarian assistance but begin to identify which intelligence challenges and successes to include in the revised training. The application of the training applicability will further refine this analysis by identifying the degree to which each

intelligence challenge or success can be addressed through the training aspect of DOTMLPF alone and which likely require the inclusion of other elements of DOTMLPF.

The third evaluation criteria is the training applicability of each intelligence challenge or success. Not all intelligence challenges or successes can be addressed through training alone. Many require a combination of DOTMLPF solutions to be fully addressed. This is evident in the common intelligence challenge of a lack of an existing unclassified COP. The solution for this challenge will require both a material solution (the COP software or system) as well as a training solution (training to use the COP software or system). Training is unique among the elements of DOTMLPF as most training can be adjusted quickly while in most cases the other elements of DOTMLPF require long lead times, typically a year or longer for doctrine or organizations and often five year or more for facilities. Those intelligence challenges and successes which can be addressed completely through training can, in most cases, be implemented quickly. This qualitative analysis will determine if the intelligence challenge or success can be addressed by training completely, moderately (50 percent or greater), or minimally (less than 50 percent). The results are presented in table 9.

Table 9. Training Applicability Evaluation Criteria

Intelligence Challenges and Successes	Completely Addressed	Moderately Addressed	Minimally Addressed
1. Inadequate intelligence capabilities during first 72 hours			X
2. Lack of an existing unclassified COP system	X		
3. No prior FHA training for JTF	X		
4. Modifying existing intelligence techniques to FHA operations	X		
5. Difficulty of split based operations		X	
6. Successful shifting of intelligence collection assets within the first five days			X
7. Maximum dissemination of unclassified products		X	
8. Rapid deployment of intelligence personnel			X
9. Effective use of commercial satellites for unclassified imagery			X
10. Developing situational understanding		X	
11. Use of unclassified Distributed Common Ground Station (DCGS)	X		

Source: Developed by author.

Four of the intelligence challenges and successes can be addressed entirely through training. Three of the intelligence challenges and successes can be moderately

addressed through training. Finally, four of the intelligence challenges and successes can only be minimally addressed through training alone.

Of the four intelligence challenges and successes evaluated to be of high importance, only one can be addressed through training alone; lack of an existing unclassified COP system. This intelligence challenge can be remedied through training of intelligence systems maintainers and systems accreditation personnel using the solution developed by the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) during Operation United Assistance to create an unclassified DCGS system. The revision of joint intelligence training to include this existing solution will resolve a universal, high importance intelligence challenge during FHA operations. The fourth and final evaluation criteria, the responsibility evaluation criteria, will evaluate whether institutional training or unit training can best address each intelligence challenge or success.

The fourth and final evaluation criteria is the responsibility of each intelligence challenge or success. This qualitative criteria will assess the ability of institutional or unit training to address each intelligence challenge or success. For purposes of this research, live exercises and training center rotations are considered unit training. The results of this analysis will be depicted in table 10.

Table 10. Responsibility Evaluation Criteria

Intelligence Challenges and Successes	Institutional Training	Unit Training
1. Inadequate intelligence capabilities during first 72 hours		X
2. Lack of an existing unclassified COP system	X	
3. No prior FHA training for JTF		X
4. Modifying existing intelligence techniques to FHA operations	X	
5. Difficulty of split based operations		X
6. Successful shifting of intelligence collection assets within the first five days		X
7. Maximum dissemination of unclassified products		X
8. Rapid deployment of intelligence personnel		X
9. Effective use of commercial satellites for unclassified imagery	X	
10. Developing situational understanding	X	
11. Use of unclassified Distributed Common Ground Station (DCGS)	X	

Source: Developed by author.

Five of the intelligence challenges and successes can best be addressed through institutional training. The remaining six intelligence challenges and successes can best be addressed through unit training. Of note, three of the four intelligence challenges and

successes which can be addressed completely through training are best addressed by institutional training to include the lack of an existing unclassified COP system.

Institutional training is best suited for intelligence challenges and successes which can be taught in a classroom environment and are general universal concepts. Unit training is best suited for intelligence challenges and successes which require practice in a realistic field environment, involved the actual movement or movement rehearsals involving actual equipment, or are unit standard operating procedures.

Answer Primary Research Question

While the screening criteria indicated that joint intelligence training should be revised to better support foreign humanitarian assistance, the evaluation criteria clearly established the existence of a high importance, universal intelligence challenge which requires training to resolve; the lack of an existing unclassified COP system. Thus the answer to the primary research question is yes, joint intelligence training should be revised to better support FHA operations.

While the need to revise joint intelligence training is unambiguous, the actual revisions required are not as clear. Several of the intelligence challenges and successes are not fully universal, of only medium importance, and can only be moderately addressed through training. It is not clear which of these intelligence challenges and successes should and which ones should not be included in the revision of joint intelligence training. In the case of split based operations it is a question of how we will do operations in the future, as an entire unit or as a split unit. Improvements in connectivity, bandwidth, and budget restrictions at this time would support the inclusion of split based operations training.

Summary of Analysis

At least some aspects of joint intelligence training should be revised to better support FHA operation. While some of the intelligence challenges and successes, such as the lack of an existing unclassified COP system should be included in the revised joint intelligence training, other intelligence challenges or successes are not universal or important enough to warrant inclusion in joint intelligence training. Other intelligence challenges and successes are less clear and require further study.

The intelligence challenge of inadequate intelligence capabilities during first 72 hours applied to two of the three selected FHA operations, is of high importance, can be only minimally addressed through training, and is best trained during unit training.

The intelligence challenge of lack of an existing unclassified COP system applied to all three selected FHA operations, is of high importance, can be completely addressed through training, and is best trained during institutional training.

The intelligence challenge of no prior FHA training for JTF applied to two of the three selected FHA operations, is of medium importance, can be completely addressed through training, and is best trained during unit training.

The intelligence challenge of modifying existing intelligence techniques to FHA operations applied to two of the three selected FHA operations, is of low importance, can be completely addressed through training, and is best trained during institutional training.

The intelligence challenge of difficulty of split based operations applied to one of the three selected FHA operations, is of low importance, can be moderately addressed through training, and is best trained during unit training.

The intelligence success of shifting intelligence collection assets within the first five days applied to two of the three selected FHA operations, is of medium importance, can be only minimally addressed through training, and is best trained during unit training.

The intelligence success of maximum dissemination of unclassified products applied to two of the three selected FHA operations, is of high importance, can be moderately addressed through training, and is best trained during unit training.

The intelligence success of rapid deployment of intelligence personnel applied to two of the three selected FHA operations, is of medium importance, can be only minimally addressed through training, and is best trained during unit training.

The intelligence success of effective use of commercial satellites for unclassified imagery applied to two of the three selected FHA operations, is of low importance, can be only minimally addressed through training, and is best trained during institutional training.

The intelligence success of developing situational understanding applied to two of the three selected FHA operations, is of high importance, can be moderately addressed through training, and is best trained during institutional training.

The intelligence success of using an unclassified Distributed Common Ground Station (DCGS) applied to one of the three selected FHA operations, is of medium importance, can be completely addressed through training, and is best trained during institutional training.

Chapter Summary

This chapter used quantitative and qualitative case study analysis methodology to answer in the affirmative the primary research question, “Should joint intelligence

training be revised to better support foreign humanitarian assistance?” This chapter further screen out intelligence challenges and successes which cannot be resolved, at least in part, through training, and discussed the universality, importance, ability to be addressed through training, and responsibility for each of the intelligence challenges and successes.

The next chapter, chapter 5, will discuss the conclusions and recommendations of this research. chapter 5 will further identify areas for future study and the applicability of this research to the Army Warfighting Challenges.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Introduction

Chapter 5 will present the conclusions and recommendations of this research based on the analysis of chapter 4 and affirmative answer of the primary research question of “Should joint intelligence training be revised to better support foreign humanitarian assistance?” This chapter will present the conclusions of the chapter 4 analysis through a weighted ranking, based on the results of the evaluation criteria, of the intelligence challenges and successes. This chapter will then make recommendations for the implementation of the results of this research as well as areas for further research. Finally, this chapter will address the applicability of this research in answering the Army Warfighting Challenges (AWfC), particularly AWfC 4.

Conclusions

This section will present the conclusions of this research through a score based rating of each intelligence challenge and success based on the results of the evaluation criteria. Each intelligence challenge or success will receive one point for each FHA operation it applies to, based on the universality evaluation results for a maximum possible score of three. Based on the importance evaluation results, each intelligence challenge or success will receive either three points for high importance, two points for medium importance, or one point for low importance. Based on the results of the evaluation criteria determining the degree to which the each intelligence challenge or success can be addressed through training, each intelligence challenge or success will

receive three points if it can be addressed completely through training, two points if it can be addressed moderately through training, and one point if it can only be minimally addressed through training. The responsibility evaluation criteria will not receive a point value but will instead be discussed as a recommendation.

The intelligence challenges and successes will be presented in an ordered fashion from the highest point total to the lowest point total. Following the presentation of the weighted, ordered intelligence challenges and successes, this research will discuss considerations which conflict with or would change the relative weighting of each intelligence challenge or success.

Table 11, presents the points received by each intelligence challenge or success as well as the overall point total. The Intelligence challenges and successes are ordered from the highest point total to the lowest point total.

Table 11. Point Ranked Intelligence Challenges and Successes

Intelligence Challenges and Successes	Universality	Importance	Training Applicability	Training Applicability	Total Points
1. Lack of an existing unclassified COP system	3	3	3	9	18
2. Developing situational understanding	3	3	2	8	16
3. No prior FHA training for JTF	2	2	3	7	14
3. Maximum dissemination of unclassified products	2	3	2	7	14
5. Inadequate intelligence capabilities during first 72 hours	2	3	1	6	12
5. Modifying existing intelligence techniques to FHA operations	2	1	3	6	12
5. Use of unclassified Distributed Common Ground Station (DCGS)	1	2	3	6	12
8. Successful shifting of intelligence collection assets within the first five days	2	2	1	5	10
8. Rapid deployment of intelligence personnel	2	2	1	5	10
10. Difficulty of split based operations	1	1	2	4	8
10. Effective use of commercial satellites for unclassified imagery	2	1	1	4	8

Source: Developed by author.

Table 11 clearly shows the universality, high importance, and ability to be completely addressed through training attributes of the intelligence challenge of the lack of an existing unclassified COP system. Ranked second, the intelligence success of developing situational understanding universally applied to all three selected case studies, is of high importance, but cannot be completely addressed through training given the technological and systems component of developing situational understanding.

Conducting FHA training prior to assuming the role as a FHA JTF as well as continuing to maximize dissemination through the production of unclassified products are the third tier of weighted results. The fourth tier of weighted intelligence challenges and successes, including inadequate intelligence capabilities during first 72 hours, modifying existing intelligence techniques to FHA operations, and the use of an unclassified Distributed Common Ground Station (DCGS) are less universally applicable but either are of high importance or can be completely resolved through training. The fifth tier of weighted intelligence challenges and successes, including the successful shifting of intelligence collection assets within the first five days and rapid deployment of intelligence personnel are both of less universal applicability and medium importance and can only be marginally reinforced through training. The sixth and lowest tier of weighted intelligence challenges and successes consisting of the intelligence challenge of the difficulty of split based operations and the intelligence success of the effective use of commercial satellites for unclassified imagery. The sixth tier consists of intelligence challenges and successes which have generally low universality, importance, and ability to be addressed through training. The weightings as depicted in table 11 are not definite fixed results. Rather, table 10 is the results at this particular time given the selected case studies. Future readers

of this research should consider the effect of changing DOTMLPF factors as they apply to the current environment. Table 11 also does not display the relationship between intelligence challenges and successes which when combined, two of the intelligence challenges or successes would increase in weighting. I will explore some of these considerations here.

The intelligence challenge of the difficulty of split based operations is one intelligence challenge or success which may significantly change in weighting in the future. In table 11, the difficulty of split based operations is in the sixth and lowest tier of weighted intelligence challenges and successes. This is based on only Operation United Assistance utilizing significant split based operations, the relatively anecdotal mention of it in the available literature, and the entire DOTMLPF revision requirements for split based operations. Currently, the Army is increasing the use of split based operations both to save money and to increase the effectiveness of forward units through additional capability and the effectiveness of garrison units through live environment training. In the future it is likely many FHA operations will utilize split based operations. Training managers should assess their likelihood of split based operations and increase the weighting accordingly.

Several of the intelligence challenges and successes identified in this study potentially complement each other and may warrant a higher weighted value together than the individual values depicted in table 11. In some cases one of the successes of a FHA operation serves as a possible solution to another FHA operation's challenge.

One example of this complimentary nature is the intelligence challenge of a lack of an existing unclassified COP system and the intelligence success of the use of

unclassified an Distributed Common Ground Station (DCGS). The DCGS is an existing program of record COP system capable of solving the intelligence challenge of a lack of an existing unclassified COP system. The only requirement to change the DCGS from its traditional classified state to an unclassified system is unclassified hard drives loaded with an existing modified software package which removes the three classified software elements. The removal of these elements does not impact the COP functionality. To implement this in a unit only requires minimal training of the systems maintainers and accreditation personnel.

Another example is the intelligence success of maximum dissemination of unclassified products, weighted in the third tier, and effective use of commercial satellites for unclassified imagery weighted in the lowest sixth tier. Adding the effective use of unclassified imagery to a training revision for maximum dissemination of unclassified products may result in a modified weighting in the second or even first tier.

Recommendations

The recommendations for this study derive not only from the weighted intelligence challenges and successes, but also accounts for the emerging use of split based operations and the complementary nature of some intelligence challenges and successes. These recommendations are designed to provide decision makers with recommendations ranked according to the evaluation criteria of universality, importance, ability to be addressed through training, and to identify if the recommendation should be the responsibility of institutional or unit training managers. The recommendation will also include recommendations for areas of future research.

The first recommendation is to revise joint intelligence institutional training to include training on how to setup, accredit, and operate an unclassified DCGS based COP during a FHA operation. This will resolve the first tier intelligence challenge of a lack of an existing unclassified COP system and reinforce the fourth tier intelligence success of the use of unclassified an Distributed Common Ground Station (DCGS) as an unclassified COP. This solution uses existing hardware and software at the unit level making this a low cost, training only, DOTMLPF solution.

The second recommendation is to reinforce the intelligence success of developing situational understanding. Commanders clearly expressed the effectiveness of intelligence personnel in developing situational understanding but did not express which aspects or techniques were most effective. Further research into the tactics, techniques, and procedures used to develop situational understanding during FHA operations is warranted.

The third recommendation of this research is to include FHA operations training as a JTF into unit certification down to the two star level of command. In both Operations Unified Response and United Assistance, two star level commands, in these cases the 82nd Airborne Division and the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) were tasked to serve as JTF headquarters, a task normal filled by a three star level headquarters. This can be incorporated into current training programs. Further study on the costs and benefits of this recommendation as well as specific options for its implementation would be of value.

The fourth recommendation of this study is to conduct further research, from a wider holistic DOTMLPF approach into the fourth and fifth tier intelligence challenges and successes. A wider DOTMLPF study could establish more clearly the cost versus

benefit of implementing solutions to these intelligence challenges and successes from a wider perspective than the training focus of this research.

Army Warfighting Challenge

This research and the resulting recommendations provide a partial answer to one of the Army's Warfighting Challenges. This research provides a partial answer to Army Warfighting Challenge 4: Adapt the Institutional Army. Specifically it partially answers Army Warfighting Challenge 4.1.2 "How does the Army's Generating Force adapt into an innovative organization that efficiently trains, mans, equips, and deploys, in support of making ready an Operating Force tasked with winning in a complex world?" and 4.2.2 "How does the Generating Force adapt situational understanding practices (AWFC #1) and organize an Operational Force capable of engaging and dominating in the information environment?" By partially answering these questions, this research supports Army leaders in making informed decisions to effectively train intelligence personnel to better support FHA operations.

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